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Health Law: 
Canadian Medical Tourism: 
Expanding Opportunities and Reducing Legal Risks 
for American Healthcare Providers 
 
R. Gregory Cochran1 
 
The term “medical tourism” commonly evokes an image of wealthy 
Americans going to Switzerland for cosmetic surgery or not-so-wealthy 
Americans going to Mexico or Canada for cheaper pharmaceutical 
products. But medical tourism from other countries, including Canadians 
coming to the U.S. for procedures, pharmaceuticals, and other 
treatments, is growing rapidly. U.S. healthcare providers have found this 
“Inbound Medical Tourism” market appealing economically because, 
among other reasons, these patients usually pay all cash in advance.  
To facilitate this line of business in the Canadian market, U.S. 
providers sometimes establish relationships with “lay” for-profit 
Canadian medical-tourism brokers to provide patients with assistance 
arranging travel and coordinating the medical services. However, 
depending on the financial aspects of such arrangements, the broker’s 
referrals to the U.S. providers may subject the providers to risk under 
U.S. fraud-and-abuse laws, including the federal Stark Law and 
Antikickback Statute (AKS), as well as their state-level analogs. U.S. 
providers may also experience great variability in the quality of 
screenings of patients and in the quality of communications with the 
Canadian primary-care medical practices.  
This chapter demonstrates that, by eliminating lay Canadian medical-
tourism brokers from the arrangements and shifting the responsibility for 
providing the traditional broker services to a primary-care medical 
practice that also identifies and screens the patients, U.S. providers can 
reduce or even eliminate much potential fraud and abuse liability. This 
model also improves the quality of the experience for patients because 
they need only interact with the Canadian medical practice for all the 
services. The U.S. providers also benefit by establishing ongoing 
relationships with a single Canadian medical practice, rather than with a 
broker whose clients are patients of countless physicians. 
 
 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from R. Gregory Cochran & Alicia Corbett, 
Canadian Medical Tourism: Expanding Opportunities and Reducing Legal Risks for 
American Healthcare Providers, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 211 (2017). 
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In-Bound Canadian Medical Tourism from Canada 
 
Despite generally higher prices in America than in many other 
nations, Canadians are among many who travel to the United States for 
medical care, seemingly motivated primarily by lengthy wait times for 
nonemergency medical procedures and diagnostic tests in the Canadian 
national healthcare system.2 Premier providers in the United States, such 
as Cleveland Clinic and Mayo Clinic, have consistently attracted foreign 
residents, particularly those from other nations in the Americas. In 
addition to attracting patients with the world-class medicine they offer, 
these institutions also assist international patients with arranging travel 
and with every other aspect of their care and treatment. Canadian patients 
who seek care from U.S. physicians and hospitals who do not offer those 
medical tourism-related services often engage lay-owned or lay-operated 
medical-tourism brokers or facilitators,3 who offer medical tourists the 
gamut of services, ranging from travel packages to identifying physicians 
and hospitals and brokering all aspects of both the medical and travel 
arrangements.4  
For several reasons, U.S. providers generally have not embraced 
Inbound Medical Tourism. Some believe it adversely affects Americans’ 
access to, and allocation of, limited healthcare resources.5 However, 
medical tourism does not do so, and it may in fact serve to increase 
access to certain technologies, procedures, and treatments. Many U.S. 
providers are also concerned about the financial risk in such unfamiliar 
and relatively untested approach. However, if structured appropriately, 
Inbound Medical Tourism can increase revenues to U.S. physicians, hos-
pitals, and their local economies.  
Some U.S. providers are also deterred from engaging in these 
arrangements because of the generally recognized legal risk in 
establishing financial relationships with referral sources under the myriad 
federal and state healthcare fraud-and-abuse laws, including 
                                                 
 2. Catherine Regis et al., Implementing Medical Travel in the Canadian Health 
Care System: Considerations for Policy Makers, 20 HEALTH L.J. 73, 74, 83–84 (2013). 
 3. The terms lay owned or lay operated here mean that the entity is not owned or 
operated by licensed healthcare professionals or healthcare entities. 
 4. See, e.g., Lydia Gan & James Frederick, Medical Tourism Facilitators: Patterns 
of Service Differentiation, 17 J. VACATION MARKETING 165, 170 (2011). 
 5. See, e.g., Y. Y. Brandon Chen & Colleen M. Flood, Medical Tourism’s Impact 
on Health Care Equity and Access in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Making the 
Case for Regulation, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286 (2013); I. Glenn Cohen, Medical 
Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011); Laura 
Hopkins et al., Medical Tourism Today: What Is the State of Existing Knowledge?, 31 J. 
PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 185, 192–94 (2010). 
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antikickback, self-referral, and fee-splitting laws. One concern is that any 
fees or other remuneration that U.S. medical providers pay to Canadian 
lay-owned brokers may, without implementing substantial safeguards, 
inappropriately encourage referrals and thus may be prohibited under 
U.S. federal or state laws, many of which call for potentially severe 
consequences for non-compliance.  
It turns out that medical tourism arrangements between U.S. and 
Canadian providers will not run afoul of the most feared U.S. federal 
fraud-and-abuse laws—the Stark Law and AKS—even if a for-profit 
medical-tourism broker is involved, because such laws apply only to 
financial arrangements involving referrals for treatment and care of 
beneficiaries of the U.S. Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal healthcare 
payor programs, for which Canadians do not qualify. But certain state 
antikickback, self-referral, and fee-splitting prohibitions typically apply 
more broadly and are not limited in their applicability only to 
arrangements where the patients are Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal 
healthcare-program beneficiaries.  
A U.S. provider’s risk of running afoul of such laws is substantially 
reduced by replacing the for-profit, lay-owned entity with a Canadian 
medical practice that does not seek to profit from the arrangement to 
provide the broker’s usual services. Further, proposed changes to 
applicable state fraud-and-abuse laws can essentially eliminate legal risk 
arising out of Inbound Medical Tourism ventures. Without 
compromising their patient-protection policy goals, such revised laws 
would assure potentially interested medical-tourism service providers 
that properly structured arrangements will be safer from a compliance 
perspective.  
 
Benefits and Nonlegal Risks 
 
The Inbound Medical Tourism model proposed here can financially 
benefit both the participating U.S. medical providers and the local 
economies where such providers are located. The model has potential 
drawbacks, including harms to the U.S. population, but the potential 
benefits outweigh the potential risks.  
Using appropriately structured models, U.S. providers benefit from 
increasing medical tourism to their facilities and communities. Canadian 
medical tourists pay the U.S. providers in advance for care out-of-pocket, 
improving cash flow and revenue and, in some cases, offsetting declining 
revenues from the providers’ other sources, including private and 
government insurance programs. 
68 Scholarship for the Bench [Vol. 2 
Medical tourists’ expenditures on travel confer another economic 
benefit on the United States, particularly on the local area where the 
services are provided, especially when medical tourists bring 
companions or when they remain in the U.S. for some time to recover 
before returning home. Medical tourism may also reduce the excess 
capacity for some medical services in the U.S. Excess capacity and 
underutilization may reduce recovery from investments in expensive 
equipment such as MRIs, thereby discouraging investment and growth.6 
Medical tourists absorb some of that excess capacity, thereby improving 
the return on physicians’ and hospitals’ investments in such technology 
and equipment. 
Indeed, medical tourism can reduce access to healthcare for the 
destination country’s poor, particularly for countries with dramatic and 
clear disparities in access to healthcare between the rich and poor.7 For 
several reasons, the Inbound Medical Tourism model proposed here 
would not create or accentuate class-based disparities in access to care. 
Inbound Medical Tourism may in many cases create a demand for 
certain procedures and technology to improve the economies of scale for 
implementing such procedures and technology, thus making them more 
available to a larger segment of the region’s population. Further, the 
class-based disparities in access to care are less likely to arise in this 
model because the U.S. providers are not likely to begin turning away 
patients and alienating their solid local network of referral physicians 
because they prefer the terms associated with their Canadian patients.  
Even if the model led to displacement of some U.S. patients, such 
displacement should be relatively insignificant and short-lived and would 
likely affect directly only the local market where medical tourists seek 
treatment. At the same time, such ventures should have a net immediate 
positive impact on health for the medical tourists and a net longer-term 
improvement on health for the local population because of improved 
access to more services and technology. 
 
Applicable U.S. Laws 
 
None of the U.S. federal fraud-and-abuse laws, such as the Stark 
Law and the AKS, poses a barrier to the Inbound Medical Tourism 
model proposed here. These laws pertain only to referrals of patients for 
                                                 
 6. See Robert S. Kaplan & Michael E. Porter, How to Solve the Cost Crisis in 
Health Care, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 47, 59 (2011).  
 7. See, e.g., Rupa Chanda, Trade in Health Services, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. 158, 160 (2002). 
 
2018] The Judges’ Book 69 
 
healthcare services financed by the U.S. federal Medicare, Medicaid, or 
certain other healthcare programs,8 of which Canadian citizens who 
reside in Canada are not and cannot be beneficiaries.9 These federal laws 
therefore impose no prohibitions on Canadian Inbound Medical Tourism. 
State fraud-and-abuse laws, however, present some risk to the 
transactions necessary to effectuate the model because these state laws 
typically are more broadly applicable to all healthcare services, 
regardless of payor source. Examples of such laws include the California 
Antikickback Statute and Health & Safety Code § 445 (collectively, the 
California Antikickback Laws) and California’s Physician Ownership 
and Referral Act (“PORA”). Providers may, however, implement certain 
safeguards to minimize such risks without substantially affecting the 
arrangement’s economic or practical benefits. 
The California Antikickback Laws present liability risk under the 
proposed model if any aspect of the compensation and services exchange 
could be construed as “compensation or inducement for” the practice’s 
referral of patients to the surgical group or to the hospital, respectively.10 
From a business perspective, the parties would prefer not to ask patients 
to pay each provider separately, so the model presumes cash will flow 
from the patients to the U.S. surgical practice, which will then 
redistribute the Canadian medical practice’s and the hospital’s portions 
to them. This redistribution of proceeds, while not per se prohibited, 
must avoid the appearance of improper “fee-splitting,” which the 
California Antikickback Laws explicitly prohibit. Structuring the 
arrangement so that the patients pay each of the three entities separately 
and maintaining documentation that such payments are consistent with 
the fair-market value of the services will substantially reduce risk for 
liability under these laws. 
California’s PORA, similar to the federal Stark law but not limited to 
beneficiaries of federal healthcare programs, prohibits physicians from 
referring patients to any provider of certain specified services (“PORA-
Covered Services”) if the physician or a member of his or her immediate 
family has a financial relationship with the provider that receives the 
referral.11 PORA-Covered Services do not include surgical services, 
however, so a Canadian medical practice’s financial relationship with a 
                                                 
 8. Other federal health programs include the Veteran’s Administration, 
CHAMPUS, and the Indian Health Services.  
 9. This analysis does not address whether a dual citizen of both the United States 
and Canada, residing in Canada, may be an American Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary.  
 10. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 650. 
 11. Id. § 650.02(a). 
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U.S. surgical practice will not be subject to PORA if the Canadian 
medical practice refers its patients to the U.S. surgical practice primarily 
for surgical services. Although such referrals undoubtedly will include 
some ancillary PORA-Covered Services, such as laboratory and x-ray 
services, PORA does not prohibit referrals even for PORA-Covered 
Services if the hospital “does not compensate the [physician] for the 
referral.”12 Thus, even if the California agencies that enforce PORA were 
to take the position that Canadian physicians are subject to PORA 
(notwithstanding that they are not California “licensees” and 
notwithstanding their physical presence outside California) their referrals 
to a U.S. surgical practice and those to the U.S. hospital will comply with 
PORA as long as none of the remuneration exchanged serves to 
compensate the physician for the referral.  
 
Legal Changes to Encourage Medical Tourism 
 
Ensuring that any fees are based on the fair-market value of the 
services provided will reduce but not eliminate the risk of liability under 
relevant state laws. To eliminate the risk, state laws should create a 
formal antikickback safe harbor and PORA exception for the kinds of 
medical-tourism arrangements proposed here. A safe harbor under the 
California Antikickback Laws could be a standalone statement like the 
other safe harbors under the California Antikickback Statute and thus 
could take the following form: 
 
An arrangement under which a provider remits a portion of a 
fee it collects from a patient to another provider or to a 
broker that arranges administrative and/or travel services for 
patients to travel to the provider, where such other provider 
or broker is located outside of California, and where such 
portion of such fee is consistent with fair market value for 
the services provided by the out-of-state provider or broker, 
and pursuant to a written arrangement between and among 
the parties, shall not be deemed to violate this Section [650] 
[445]. 
 
A PORA exception could be worded almost identically except to 
delete the phrase “shall not be deemed to violate this Section [650] 
[445]” to conform to PORA structure. Legislators also could make a 
policy decision on whether to permit payment of a portion of the fee to 
                                                 
 12. Id. § 650.02(c)(1). 
 
2018] The Judges’ Book 71 
 
any broker or limit allowed payments to those made to other medical 
professionals or medical practices. 
These statutory revisions would permit U.S. surgical practices or 
hospitals to collect the entire fee from the patient and in turn pay the 
Canadian medical practice a reasonable fee based on the fair-market 
value of the services provided by the Canadian medical practice in 
administering the arrangement, without fear of legal liability or 




Although enabling medical tourists, particularly Canadians, to seek 
care in U.S. hospitals can be a win-win situation for providers and their 
communities, U.S. medical providers of services to medical tourists face 
an uncertain regulatory environment with respect to the state equivalents 
of the federal AKS and Stark Law. Providers may take certain steps to 
significantly reduce this liability risk. To eliminate the risk, state 
legislators and regulators should revise current laws to permit doctors 
and hospitals to enter into a wider range of medical-tourism 
arrangements. Lawmakers can do so without affecting the laws’ patient-
protection policy goals, and such changes may also incentivize the 
tourists’ home countries to ameliorate the problems that led their citizens 
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